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Abstract
In this paper the existence of unemployment is partly explained as being the result of
coordination failures. It is shown that as a result of self-fullling pessimistic expectations,
even at Walrasian prices, a continuum of equilibria results, among which an equilibrium
with approximately no trade and a Walrasian equilibrium. These coordination failures also
arise at other price systems, but then unemployment is the result of both a wrong price
system and coordination failures. Some properties of the set of equilibria are analyzed.
Generically, there exists a continuum of non-indierent equilibrium allocations. Under a
condition implied by gross substitutability, there exists a continuum of equilibrium allo-
cations in the neighborhood of a competitive allocation. We nally study some dynamic
properties of our equilibria in specialized economies.
JEL classication: C62, D51
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2
1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by the recent renewal of interest in equilibria with price rigidities,
an interest stemming from motivations quite dierent from those which spurred the work
on that topic in the seventies, see the survey by Drazen (1980). The earlier interest re-
ected the premise that equilibria with quantity rationing are due to \wrong" prices, at
which markets cannot clear. The more recent interest originates with the work of Roberts
(1987ab, 1989ab) who established the existence of a continuum of equilibria with quantity
rationing of supply at competitive prices, for a class of economies characterised by homoth-
etic preferences (or household replication) and constant returns to scale. These equilibria
do not reect price distortions, but rather coordination failures; they are sustained, but
not \caused", by downward rigidity of (some) prices. In this new framework, the extent of
rationing is not linked to the size of price distortions and multiple equilibria are the rule.
The work of Roberts invites generalization in several directions:
(i) Relaxing the special assumptions on the primitives;
(ii) Allowing for the possibility of non-competitive prices;
(iii) Allowing for the combination of xed and exible prices;
(iv) Explaining the persistence of downward (real) price rigidities;
(v) Understanding the nature and the sources of the coordination failures.
Several authors have contributed partial generalizations. In the framework of pure
exchange economies, Herings (1996ab, 1998) addresses (i) and (ii), whereas Dreze (1997),
building upon Dehez and Dreze (1984) and inspired by Roberts and Herings addresses
(i), (ii) and (iii) in the framework of an economy with production. His result is weaker,
however; it establishes existence of equilibria with arbitrarily severe rationing, but not
a continuum of equilibria. Dreze (1999) addresses in addition (iv) and (v) by arguing -
outside the formal model - that uncertainty and incomplete markets help explain both
downward price rigidities for selected commodities (labor and capacities) and the volatility
of aggregate demand (investment) which sustains the self-fullling expectations.
The present paper considers a general equilibrium model with production and the com-
bination of xed/exible prices, thereby treating the general model specication. Our
paper extends the result of Dreze to existence of a continuum of underemployment equi-
libria. It thus addresses (i)-(iii) in a general framework. The equilibrium concept is a
generalization of supply-constrained equilibrium as used by Kurz (1982), van der Laan
(1980, 1982), and Dehez and Dreze (1984), here labeled \underemployment equilibrium"
(see Denition 2.1).
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Our interpretation of underemployment equilibria is in line with the interpretation of
Hahn (1978) of non-Walrasian equilibria as the result of self-fullling beliefs. Suppose
prices are Walrasian, but neither rms nor households have the structural knowledge to
verify this fact, and are therefore justied in forming expectations on supply possibilities. If
rms expect that the total demand for their output is low, then they will hire only a limited
amount of labor. This has a negative impact on income of workers and thereby indeed leads
to a low demand for outputs. Workers, expecting to be (partially) unemployed, supply
limited amounts of labor and express low demands for commodities, thereby conrming
the rms' expectations. The game-theoretic models developed by Roberts make clear that
this reasoning is consistent with rationality, and even with the absence of deviating rms
that sell at a lower price. Moreover, since coordination failures exist at non-Walrasian
prices as well, but are then compounded by the eects of distorted prices, lowering prices
will not improve the situation. These considerations touch (iv), even though much more
remains to be better understood.
We also deal with the issue of whether underemployment equilibria are genuinely dis-
tinct, that is, whether they lead to dierent utilities for the consumers. Moreover, in game
theory and macroeconomics, coordination failures have the connotation of Pareto ranked
equilibria. Pareto ranked equilibria are present in the seminal work on coordination failures
of Bryant (1983) and Cooper and John (1988), see Cooper (1999) for an excellent overview
of this literature, where a continuum of equilibria ranging from a no-trade equilibrium to
a competitive equilibrium is found. We give sucient conditions in our general model
specication to obtain this property.
Finally, we interpret the static general equilibrium model as an intertemporal economy.
To do so, we specialize the general setting to an exchange economy in which consumers have
logarithmic preferences and are endowed only in one commodity. The intertemporal in-
terpretation of these specialized economies results in an intriguing ination-unemployment
trade-o: when prices increase, unemployment also increases. When we posit that prices
adjust over time through a Walrasian non - ta^tonnement process, we observe that this
process monotonically approaches Walrasian prices. Moreover, it does not require demand
rationing at any time and does not necessarily reduce the overall underemployment level
in the economy.
2 The Model
Form 2 IN; IR
m
+
is the non-negative orthant of IR
m
; and IR
m
++
is the strictly positive orthant
of IR
m
: Vector inequalities will be denoted by ; <; ; ; >; and  :
An economy is denoted by E = ((X
h
;
h
; e
h
)
h2H
; (Y
f
; (
fh
)
h2H
)
f2F
; ep
II
; ; ): There
2
are H households, indexed by h 2 H; F rms, indexed by f 2 F; and L commodities,
indexed by l 2 L:
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Every household h has a consumption set X
h
; a preference relation

h
on X
h
; and an initial endowment e
h
2 IR
L
: The Cartesian product of the sets X
h
is
denoted by
e
X; so
e
X =
Q
h2H
X
h
: Every rm f has a production possibility set Y
f
: The
set of total production possibilities,
P
f2F
Y
f
; is denoted by Y: The Cartesian product of
the production possibility sets is denoted by
e
Y ; so
e
Y =
Q
f2F
Y
f
: Household h receives a
share 
fh
of the prots of rm f:
The commodities are split into two groups, labeled I and II. Whenever such a label is
attached to a symbol, it is meant to refer to the group of commodities indicated by the
label. For instance, L
I
will denote the number and the set of group I commodities. Without
loss of generality, group I consists of the rst L
I
commodities. The prices of commodities
in group I are assumed to be completely exible, even in the short run. The markets for
these commodities are organized in such a way that prices will immediately react to small
changes in supply or demand. Examples are auctions (as for sh) or organized (commodity
or stock) exchanges. The markets for these commodities are therefore never cleared by
rationing in an equilibrium. The prices of commodities in group II on the contrary are
xed in the short run. Like many markets in the real world, small changes in supply or
demand are not immediately reected by a change in the price. Hence there is scope for
rationing in the markets for these commodities, and agents in the economy may indeed
expect rationing to occur in these markets. For real world examples of this phenomenon,
we refer to the existence of persistent unemployment and the presence of excess capacity
in many sectors.
The prices of the commodities in group II are given by ep
II
2 IR
L
II
++
:We will normalize the
prices such that
P
l2L
II
ep
II
l
= 1: Nothing precludes to take for ep
II
the values corresponding
to a Walrasian equilibrium price system, if such a price system exists. If group I is empty,
then all prices are xed in the short run. We will assume that group II is non-empty, since
otherwise we are back in the standard competitive framework.
Both for households and for rms, restrictions on supply seem to occur much more
frequently in western economies than restrictions on demand, as has also been remarked by
van der Laan (1980) and Kurz (1982). Therefore, in this paper attention will be restricted
to cases with rationing on the supply side of households and rms, while the demand side
will never be rationed. In the case of excess supplies, one needs a distributional rule to
determine the nal allocation that will result. Such a distributional rule is called a rationing
system. In this paper we will consider the case where each household and each rm has
a xed predetermined market share, which allows for several interesting special cases like
1
The use of H; F; and L for the number and the set of households, rms and commodities, respectively,
will not create ambiguities.
3
uniform or proportional rationing systems. Our existence results hold a fortiori for more
general rationing schemes admitting xed predetermined market shares as a special case.
The vector  2 IR
HL
II
++
determines the market shares of the households (its components
are denoted by 
h
l
) and the vector  2 IR
FL
II
++
(with components denoted by 
f
l
) those of
the rms. This rationing system implies that for every commodity l 2 L
II
there exists
r
l
2 IR
+
such that the supply possibilities for every household h of commodity l are given
by 
h
l
r
l
and the supply possibilities for every rm f of commodity l are equal to 
f
l
r
l
:
In Sections 4 and 5 we will extensively study the case of an economy with households
facing a proportional rationing system. In a proportional rationing system, 
h
= e
h
;
h 2 H; so that for every h and l, supply possibilities are given by r
l
e
h
l
: In this case r
l
can be interpreted as the proportion of good l endowment which is sellable on the market
according to the rationing system, and r is said to be a vector of rations. This mechanism
is justied when rationing is determined by the size of eective demand relative to total
resources and households are treated symmetrically.
The vectors  and  only determine the supply possibilities of households and rms.
Households and rms are completely free to demand a commodity and not to make use at
all of the supply possibilities. The rationing system is treated like a black box. In reality
these market shares are determined by all kind of factors that we will ignore in our model,
like the ability of suppliers to sell their products, the location of households and rms, or
the existing relationships between them.
The expectations of available supply opportunities for a household h (rm f) on the
various markets are described by a vector z
h
2  IR
L
II
+
(y
f
2 IR
L
II
+
), called the expected
opportunities for household h (rm f). The vector of expected opportunities (z; y) =
(z
1
; : : : ; z
H
; y
1
; : : : y
F
) describes the constraints expected in the economy. In equilibrium
the expected opportunities are required to be rational. These expectations should therefore
match the amounts allocated by the rationing system. For the case of the rationing system
with xed predetermined market shares, the set of all expected opportunities that are
relevant is given by the L
II
-dimensional set ZY (fully determined by r for given  and ),
where
ZY =
n
(z; y) 2  IR
HL
II
+
 IR
FL
II
+



9r 2 IR
L
II
+
; 8h 2 H; 8f 2 F; z
h
l
=  
h
l
r
l
; y
f
l
= 
f
l
r
l
; l 2 L
II
o
:
Firms are assumed to be prot maximizers. For every rm f; given expected opportunities
y
f
2 IR
L
II
+
; the set of feasible production plans, s
f
(y
f
); is dened by
s
f
(y
f
) =

y
f
2 Y
f


y
f;II
 y
f
	
:
Similarly, for every rm f; given a price system p 2 IR
L
and expected opportunities y
f
2
4
IR
L
II
+
; the set of production plans maximizing prot, 
f
(p; y
f
); is dened by

f
(p; y
f
) =

by
f
2 s
f
(y
f
)


p  by
f
 p  y
f
; 8y
f
2 s
f
(y
f
)
	
:
If the set 
f
(p; y
f
) is non-empty, then the prot of rm f is dened by 
f
(p; y
f
) = p  y
f
;
for y
f
2 
f
(p; y
f
): If the set 
f
(p; y
f
) is non-empty for every rm f; then the wealth of a
household h; w
h
; is determined by the value of its initial endowments and the shares in
the prots of the rms, w
h
= p  e
h
+
P
f2F

fh

f
(p; y
f
): The budget set of a household
h facing a price system p 2 IR
L
; having expected opportunities z
h
2  IR
L
II
+
; and having
wealth w
h
 p  e
h
is denoted by 
h
(p; z
h
; w
h
); so

h
(p; z
h
; w
h
) =

x
h
2 X
h


p  x
h
 w
h
and x
h;II
  e
h;II
 z
h
	
;
and its demand set 
h
(p; z
h
; w
h
) is dened by

h
(p; z
h
; w
h
) =

x
h
2 
h
(p; z
h
; w
h
)


x
h

h
x
h
; 8x
h
2 
h
(p; z
h
; w
h
)
	
:
The total excess demand in the economy, given p 2 IR
L
and expected opportunities (z; y) 2
ZY ; is dened by
(p; z; y) =
X
h2H

h
(p; z
h
; p  e
h
+
X
f2F

fh

f
(p; y
f
)) 
X
h2H
e
h
 
X
f2F

f
(p; y
f
):
We are now in a position to give a denition of an underemployment equilibrium.
Denition 2.1 (Underemployment equilibrium)
An underemployment equilibrium of the economy E = ((X
h
;
h
; e
h
)
h2H
; (Y
f
; (
fh
)
h2H
)
f2F
;
ep
II
; ; ) is an element (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

) 2 IR
L

e
X 
e
Y  ZY satisfying
1. for every household h 2 H; x
h
2 
h
(p

; z
h
; p

 e
h
+
P
f2F

fh
p

 y
f
);
2. for every rm f 2 F; y
f
2 
f
(p

; y
f
);
3.
P
h2H
x
h
 
P
h2H
e
h
 
P
f2F
y
f
= 0;
4. p
II
= ep
II
:
The set of all underemployment equilibria of an economy E is denoted by E: Notice that
the denition of an underemployment equilibrium implies that the expected opportunities
(z

; y

) belong to ZY : The expectations match the amounts determined by the rationing
system.
The notion of Walrasian equilibrium ts easily in our framework. This is important
since in many of our results we will be focussing on the possibility of coordination failures,
and therefore non-Walrasian equilibria, at Walrasian prices.
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Denition 2.2 (Walrasian equilibrium)
An underemployment equilibrium (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

) 2 IR
L

e
X 
e
Y  ZY of the economy
E = ((X
h
;
h
; e
h
)
h2H
; (Y
f
; (
fh
)
h2H
)
f2F
; ep
II
; ; ) is a Walrasian equilibrium if
1. for every household h 2 H; z
h
< x
h
  e
h
;
2. for every rm f 2 F; y
f
< y
f
:
In Sections 4 and 5 we will focus on the subset of economies with no production,
L
II
= L, i.e. prices are xed for all goods, and with proportional rationing. We denote this
subset of economies by A. These economies are particularly suited to further discuss our
existence results and to illustrate some properties of equilibria in our model when there is
coexistence of underemployment with rationing and Walrasian prices, i.e., ep
II
is Walrasian.
Denition 2.1 applied to this class of economies can be easily stated relative to the
underemployment equilibrium vector (p

; x

; r

) 2 IR
L
++
 IR
HL
++
 IR
L
+
; rather than to
(p

; x

; z

) : For economies in A, we use the equilibrium ration r

rather than the rationing
scheme z

; as it is more natural in this context. Of course, the two measures are totally
equivalent.
It should be noted that in this special case and when p

= ep
II
is Walrasian, it makes little
sense to consider cases with r
l
> 1 for some l, since then households are not constrained
at all in their sales of good l. Indeed, we can state an even stronger property of equilibria
in this special case. Hence without loss of generality we can assume that r 2 [0; 1]
L
.
For l 2 L; we dene
r
l
(E ; p

) = max
1hH

1 
x
h
l
e
h
l

;
where x =
 
x
1
; :::; x
H

is the Walrasian allocation associated to the economy E with prices
p

. The vector r(E ; p

) gives the ration needed to attain the Walrasian allocation.
Proposition 2.3
For any economy E 2 A ; given a Walrasian equilibrium price p

; all rations r  r(E ; p

)
are nonbinding equilibrium rations, i.e. the associated equilibrium allocations are Wal-
rasian.
The proof is immediate from the denition of equilibrium.
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3 Existence of a Continuum of Underemployment Equi-
libria
3.1 Assumptions
In this section we show the existence of a continuum of underemployment equilibria. We
will make use of the following assumptions with respect to the economy E :
A1. For every household h 2 H; the consumption set X
h
is non-empty, closed, convex,
and X
h
 IR
L
+
:
A2. For every household h 2 H; the preference relation 
h
is complete, transitive, contin-
uous, convex, and for every x
h
2 X
h
there exists bx
h
2 X
h
such that x
h;II
= bx
h;II
and
x
h

h
bx
h
; and there exists ex
h
2 X
h
such that x
h;I
= ex
h;I
; x
h;II
< ex
h;II
; and x
h

h
ex
h
:
A3. For every household h 2 H; there is x
h
2 X
h
such that x
h;I
 e
h;I
and x
h;II
= e
h;II
;
and for all l
0
2 L
II
there is x
h
2 X
h
such that x
h;I
 e
h;I
; x
h
l
0
< e
h
l
0
; and x
h
l
= e
h
l
;
8l 2 L
II
n fl
0
g:
A4. For every rm f 2 F; the production possibility set Y
f
is closed, convex,  IR
L
+
 Y
f
;

fh
 0; 8h 2 H; and
P
h2H

fh
= 1: Moreover, Y \  Y  f0g:
A5. The price system and the rationing system satisfy ep
II
2 IR
L
II
++
with
P
l2L
II
ep
II
l
= 1;
 2 IR
HL
II
++
; and  2 IR
FL
II
++
:
A6. For every household h 2 H; the consumption set X
h
= IR
L
+
; the preference relation

h
can be represented by a utility function u
h
; where u
h
is twice dierentiable on
IR
L
++
; @u
h
 0; @
2
u
h
is negative denite on (@u
h
)
?
;
2
and u
h
(e
h
)  u
h
(x
h
); for every
x
h
2 IR
L
+
n IR
L
++
: For every rm f 2 F; the production possibility set is described
by a twice continuously dierentiable function g
f
: IR
L
! IR; so Y
f
= fy
f
2 IR
L
j
g
f
(y
f
)  0g; and for any y
f
on the production frontier fy
f
2 Y
f
j g
f
(y
f
) = 0g it
holds that @
2
g
f
is positive denite on (@g
f
)
?
:
A7. The set of group I commodities is empty, and for every l 2 L; there exists h 2 H such
that e
h
=2 
h
(ep
II
; 0
 l
; ep
II
 e
h
) or there exists f 2 F such that 0 =2 
f
(ep
II
; 0
 l
):
A8. The economy E has a well-dened aggregate excess demand function z : IR
L
++

ZY ! IR
L
: If (p
0
; z
0
; y
0
)  (p; z; y) with p
0
l
0
= p
l
0
; z
0
l
0
= z
l
0
; and y
0
l
0
= y
l
0
; then
z
l
0
(p
0
; z
0
; y
0
)  z
l
0
(p; z; y):
2
\
?
" denotes the orthogonal complement.
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The often made assumption in the xed-price literature that X
h
= IR
L
+
or that X
h
+
IR
L
+
 X
h
is replaced by the weaker assumption A1.
3
Assumption A2 implies that there
is non-satiation with respect to the group I commodities and with respect to the group II
commodities, a weaker requirement than monotonicity of preferences.
A preference relation 
h
is said to be convex if x
h
; bx
h
2 X
h
and x
h

h
bx
h
implies
x
h

h
x
h
+ (1  )bx
h
; 8 2 [0; 1):
The somewhat clumsy statement of Assumptions A2 and A3 guarantees that for the
case L
II
= 0 we make the same assumptions as Debreu (1959). For the case L
II
 1;
our assumptions coincide with those of Debreu for an economy consisting of the rst L
I
commodities.
Assumption A6, which will only be needed for part of the results, states the standard
dierentiability requirements on the primitive concepts, see for instance Mas-Colell (1985).
Assumption A7, which is also only needed for part of the results, is satised if households
and rms are fully rationed in all markets, but the market for commodity l
0
; and households
receive no prot income, then at least one household or rm prefers supplying commodity
l
0
over remaining inactive. By 0
 l
0
for some l
0
2 L we denote expectations of no supply
opportunities in the market for every commodity in L being dierent from l
0
; and no
rationing in the market for commodity l
0
: In particular, z
h
= 0
 l
0
implies that z
h
l
= 0;
8l 2 L n fl
0
g; and z
h
l
0
= \   1"; and y
f
= 0
 l
0
implies that y
f
l
= 0; 8l 2 L n fl
0
g; and
y
f
l
0
= \+1":Requiring this at Walrasian prices would considerably weaken the assumption,
since Walrasian prices are already balanced in some sense. Moreover, that we only need
the assumption in the case households or rms expect to be fully restricted in the supply of
all other commodities is also pleasant, since it means that supplying the commodity under
consideration is the only way to achieve a positive income.
In addition to these primitive assumptions about individual agents, we shall need for our
strongest result (Theorem 3.1.iii) an assumption akin to gross substitution. The assump-
tion used in our proof of that result is a weaker form of the more intuitive Assumption A8.
In the case of exchange economies, A8 could be stated for individual demands and would be
preserved under aggregation. For this case Movshovich (1994) gives assumptions on prim-
itive concepts implying a stronger form of A8. The specialized economies to be considered
in Section 5 can also be shown to satisfy A8.
Assumption A8 states that the net demand for any one good does not increase when the
prices and/or supply possibilities of other commodities are decreased. It is not required that
3
Examples where the usual assumptions are not satised but ours are, concern group II commodities for
which there is a clear physical upper bound on consumption in a given time interval, or commodities that
can only be consumed together with a sucient amount of another commodity. For instance, consumption
at a remote place can only take place together with certain transportation services. Some services cannot
be supplied without sucient education.
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the net demand for the other commodities increases. Actually, we only use that assumption
starting from a competitive equilibrium, and still in weaker form. But we are unable to
illustrate meaningfully what is gained by the weakening. For instance, the assumptions on
individual primitives required to guarantee gross substitution at a competitive equilibrium
imply gross substitution everywhere.
We could state A8 for correspondences, following Polterovich and Spivak (1983), but
we use it in conjunction with A6, hence for functions, and therefore state it for functions.
3.2 The Existence Theorem
Consider two underemployment equilibria (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

); (bp

; bx

; by

;bz

;by

) of an econ-
omy E : These two underemployment equilibria are said to be dierent if there exists a
household h such that x
h
6= bx
h
: There is at least one household receiving a dierent
consumption bundle. The way in which the production of the consumption bundles takes
place or the prices against which trade takes place is of no concern for the notion of dif-
ferent underemployment equilibria. A stronger criterion for the distinction between two
underemployment equilibria is given by the consideration of the utility tuples of the house-
holds. Two underemployment equilibria (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

) and (bp

; bx

; by

;bz

;by

) are said
to be strongly dierent if there exists a household h such that x
h

h
bx
h
or bx
h

h
x
h
:
Notice that two strongly dierent underemployment equilibria are also dierent. Our rst
aim is to provide conditions for the existence of a continuum of (strongly) dierent under-
employment equilibria.
By Debreu (1959), (1) and (2) page 77, it follows that the set of attainable allocations of
the economy E ; A = f(x; y) 2
e
X
e
Y j
P
h2H
x
h
 
P
h2H
e
h
 
P
f2F
y
f
= 0g; is compact. Let
b > 0 be such that k(x; y)k
1
< b; 8(x; y) 2 A: Since A is compact, such a b exists, and since
(e; 0) 2 A it follows that b > max
h2H;l2L
e
h
l
: Observe that all dierent underemployment
equilibria are obtained when attention is restricted to expected opportunities (z; y) 2 ZY
satisfying, for every l 2 L
II
; minf z
h
l
; y
f
l
j h 2 H; f 2 Fg  b: The set of underemployment
equilibria sustained by such expectations is denoted by
b
E:
The extent to which the market for a commodity l 2 L
II
is employed in an underem-
ployment equilibrium (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

) in
b
E will be measured by the number 
l
2 [0; 1];
where

l
=
1
b
minf z
h
l
; y
f
l
j h 2 H; f 2 Fg:
If 
l
= 0; then the market for commodity l has collapsed completely and no supply is
expected to take place. If 
l
= 1; then no binding constraints on supply are expected
in the market for commodity l: We will need this measure of employment to distinguish
9
between dierent underemployment equilibria.
4
Theorem 3.1
Let E = ((X
h
;
h
; e
h
)
h2H
; (Y
f
; (
fh
)
h2H
)
f2F
; ep
II
; ; ) be an economy with H  2:
(i) Under A1-A5, the set of underemployment equilibria
b
E owns a connected component
b
E
c
which includes an underemployment equilibrium with max
l2L
II 
l
=  for all  2
(0; 1]:
(ii) Under A1-A6, L
I
 1; or L
I
= 0 and A7, generically
5
in initial endowments,
b
E owns
a component
b
E
c
which contains a continuum of strongly dierent underemployment
equilibria.
(iii) Under A1-A6 and A8, if ep
II
= p
II
with (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

) a Walrasian equilibrium,
b
E
owns a component
b
E
c
which ranges from an equilibrium with approximately no trade
in group II commodities at prices p  p

to the competitive equilibrium (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

):
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.3 Interpretation of the Theorem
Theorem 3.1.i states that there is a connected set of underemployment equilibria ranging
from an underemployment equilibrium with arbitrarily low trade in the group II commodi-
ties to an equilibrium without rationing in the market for at least one group II commodity.
The markets for the group I commodities are in equilibrium without rationing. This
means that there are many dierent expectations leading to an underemployment equilib-
rium, ranging from the expectations that no household and no rm will supply a positive
amount of any group II commodity, to the expectations that at least in one market for
group II commodities free trade without rationing is possible. There exists an underem-
ployment equilibrium (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

) 2
b
E
c
with x
;II
arbitrarily close to e
II
; and y
;II
; z

;
and y

all arbitrarily close to zero, so with all 
l
arbitrarily close to zero. Furthermore,
there exists an underemployment equilibrium (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

) 2
b
E
c
where for some l 2 L
II
it holds that no household and no rm faces binding expected opportunities in the market
for commodity l; so x
h
l
  e
h
l
> z
h
l
; 8h 2 H; and y
f
l
< y
f
l
; 8f 2 F; and 
l
is equal to
4
For the special case of E 2 A, it is possible to take b = max
l2L
P
h2H
e
h
l
: Note that r
l
 1 implies
that 
l
 1, all l. In fact, 
l
will be in general strictly less than one, since 
l
= (1=b) r
l
min
h2H
e
h
l
, all
l: For economies in A we will frequently use r to distinguish between dierent equilibria as it has a more
straightforward interpretation. Of course, r
l
and 
l
are just linear transformations of each other.
5
When L
I
= 0 and A7 hold, the qualier `generically' can be omitted.
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one. These two \extreme" equilibria are contained in a connected set of underemployment
equilibria.
Figure 1 to 3 illustrate some possibilities for the structure of the set of underemployment
equilibria when E 2 A; prices are Walrasian, and L = 2: Since there are L instruments to
clear L markets, so there are L  1 independent market clearing equations by Walras' law,
one expects a 1-dimensional set of equilibria under suitable regularity conditions. When
r exceeds r(E ; p

); these regularity conditions are obviously violated, which explains the
rectangular area in Figures 1 to 3.
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3
r
1
r
1
r
1
r
2
r
2
r
2
r
1
r
2
-
6
-
6
-
6
  

 
We will show by means of Example 4.1 in Section 4 that it is possible that there is no
underemployment equilibrium in the set
b
E with 
l
exactly equal to 0 for all l: However,
we notice that for E 2 A, no trade equilibria are always underemployment equilibria with
r
l
= 0 all l (hence, with 
l
= 0, all l) when the price system is strictly positive.
In principle, underemployment equilibria obtained in Theorem 3.1.i may all correspond
to the same allocation. This is for instance the case if initial endowments are Pareto
optimal. Otherwise, it is well-known that Walrasian equilibria will involve nonzero trade
in at least one market. Therefore, Theorem 3.1.i already implies existence of non-Walrasian
underemployment equilibria when the price system is Walrasian and initial endowments
are not Pareto optimal.
However, the situation could still be the one of Figure 3. There are two possible under-
employment equilibrium allocations, the no-trade allocation and the Walrasian allocation.
This case is dismal from an economic point of view, because arbitrarily small perturbations
away from competitive expectations would then lead to a severe depression. The second
example in Section 4 discusses such a case in detail.
Theorem 3.1.ii makes clear that generically the continuum of underemployment equilib-
ria that is shown to exist in Theorem 3.1.i yields a continuum of strongly dierent under-
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employment equilibria, with or without rationing. Keeping everything xed, except initial
endowments, there exists a subset 
 of IR
HL
++
such that the closure of IR
HL
++
n
 in IR
HL
++
has
Lebesgue measure zero, and for every specication of initial endowments (e
1
; : : : ; e
H
) 2 
;
there is a continuum of strongly dierent underemployment equilibria. Generically in ini-
tial endowments, there is a continuum of dierent utilities that households can have in
an underemployment equilibrium, irrespective of the prices of group II commodities being
compatible with competitive values or not. If those prices have competitive values, then
the Walrasian equilibrium is one of the underemployment equilibria. There is a continuum
of equilibria that involve rationing. This follows immediately from the fact that Walrasian
equilibrium is generically locally unique. Generically in initial endowments, the set of
underemployment equilibria is therefore as depicted in Figure 1 or 2.
Under which circumstances is there a continuum of underemployment allocations near
a competitive allocation? For such a result to be true, it is necessary that ep
II
be compatible
with a competitive equilibrium. Theorem 3.1.iii shows that the connected component of
underemployment equilibria containing an equilibrium with approximately no trade in
group II commodities also contains a Walrasian equilibrium if A8 is invoked, i.e. the
structure of the set of underemployment equilibria is as in Figure 1. From this it follows
by a simple argument that there is an underemployment equilibrium with min
l2L
II 
l
equal
to any  2 (0; 1]: Values of  close to one correspond to approximately Walrasian equilibria.
Theorem 3.1 is striking since it even holds in the circumstances that are most favorable
for competitive equilibrium: all prices of group II commodities equal to competitive values
and, in a world with time and uncertainty, all future commodities belong to group I.
The intuition behind Theorem 3.1 is best explained by considering the case where
group II consists of commodities that we call labor services and group I of consumption
goods. Labor services are supplied by the households to the rms, which use them to
produce the consumption goods. If households expect that the total demand by rms
for labor services is low, then households expect to have low incomes, and express low
demands for consumption goods. Even though consumption goods belong to group I, so
their markets clear, rms need to hire few labor services to meet the depressed demand
for consumption goods. The low demand for labor services by rms thereby conrms
the pessimistic expectations of the households. Theorem 3.1 makes clear that there is a
continuum of pessimistic expectations that are sustained in equilibrium.
As Dreze (1997) argues, this reasoning can be given empirical underpinning. Theo-
rem 3.1 shows that this reasoning can be veried formally. For the result to hold one needs
downwards rigidity of the prices of the group II commodities. Otherwise, excess supplies
of group II commodities could lead to lower prices of these commodities. However, Theo-
rem 3.1 makes clear that also at those lower prices, there is again scope for coordination
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failures. It may be dicult to get out of a situation with coordination failures. All the
households and rms together would have to revise their expectations simultaneously. An
explicit dynamic process of expectation formation on prices and supply opportunities is
presented in Section 5.
Following the arguments of Dreze (1997), Theorem 3.1 has even more important eco-
nomic consequences. For instance, it makes clear that the observation of excess supply is
not sucient to infer the existence of price and wage distortions. Indeed, Theorem 3.1.i
and 3.1.ii hold for any price system for the group II commodities, whereas the prices of the
group I commodities are completely exible. When prices or wages are not at competitive
values, their distorting eects can even be magnied by coordination failures as expressed
in Theorem 3.1.i. Because of the multiplicity of underemployment equilibria, the modelling
of dynamics becomes crucial, and history will play an important role.
4 Two Examples
In this section we study two examples of our economies which will help illustrate Theorem
3.1.
The rst is an example of an economy, which displays no underemployment equilibrium
at which 
l
= 0 for all l 2 L
II
:
Example 4.1
Consider the economy E = ((IR
2
+
);
1
; (1; 1); (Y
f
; 1); 1; ; ); where 
1
is represented by
the utility function u
1
(x
1
1
; x
1
2
) = x
1
1
x
1
2
; Y
1
= fy
1
2 IR
2
+
j y
1
2
 0; y
1
1

p
 y
1
2
g; L
I
= 1;
and L
II
= 1: The rationing system (; ) can be chosen arbitrarily (satisfying A5). This
example satises A1-A5. Therefore we know by Theorem 3.1.i that there exists a connected
set of underemployment equilibria that contains an underemployment equilibrium with
max
l2L
II 
l
= 
2
= ; for all  2 (0; 1]: Solving the rm's prot maximization problem
yields that for every p
1
2 IR
+
; for every y
1
2
2 IR
+
; 
1
((p
1
; 1); y
1
2
) = fp
1
=2; (p
1
)
2
=4g and

1
((p
1
; 1); y
1
2
) = (p
1
)
2
=4: Since the rm never wants to supply commodity 2, it is never
aected by the supply opportunities expected in this market.
Let the household be constrained by x
1
2
  1   : If it supplies  to the rm, then
p
1
= 2
p
 is required for prot maximization. At that price, the unconstrained demand of
the household is x
1
= (1+
p
1
2
)
2
=(2p
1
); x
2
= (1+
p
1
2
)
2
=2: Hence, x
2
 1 <   = 1 (p
1
)
2
=4 i
p
1

2
3
; or equivalently  
1
9
; in which case the constraint is binding. There is a continuum
of strongly dierent equilibria for  2 (0;
1
9
] with p
1
= 2
p
; but there is no equilibrium at
 = 0; since this would imply p
1
= 0 and excess demand of good 1:
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In Example 4.1, rms can transform labor into the consumption good at unboundedly large
rates for small amounts of labor. Firms keep supplying the consumption good, no matter
how low its price. This unrealistic feature drives the price of the consumption good to
zero if expectations on employment are very pessimistic, which excludes the existence of
an equilibrium at  = 0: If an input vector subject to supply rationing is used to produce
an output not subject to supply rationing and desired by consumers, then technology and
tastes should be such that there exists a relative price for the output at which it is neither
supplied nor demanded, given the prices and expected opportunities for the other goods.
It is dicult to formulate assumptions on primitives that imply such a property, which
should be related to the existence of a nite rate of transformation of inputs into outputs.
The second example shows, in the context of economies in the class A, that Theorem
3.1.ii does not hold without Assumption A7, and we might not even have a continuum of
strongly dierent rationing equilibria.
Example 4.2
Consider an economy E 2 A with H = 2 and L = 3. For each household, the budget set
at a Walrasian price system p, without the rationing constraints, forms a triangle in IR
3
++
:
The rationing constraint corresponds to a line on the triangular surface of the budget set.
Observe that the line associated with the constraint x
1
1
  e
1
1
  r
1
e
1
1
is parallel to the
axis of good 2. The lower r
1
; the farther away this line from the axis. A similar situation
occurs for the constraint on good 2, which is parallel to the axis of good 1. For good 3,
the constraint line is parallel to the base of the triangle.
The Edgeworth box in this economy is a parallelepiped. The common budget set is a
plane (which contains the two triangular budget sets of each consumer). The intersection
of the box with this plane will in general have the shape of an irregular convex hexagon,
with parallel opposite sides, corresponding to the area common to the triangles. Observe
that in the Edgeworth box a given r cuts the budget set from opposite sides for the two
households. Graphically, it is therefore convenient to use r
h
l
to label the line corresponding
to r
l
for household h: At the Walrasian allocation, there is an indierence surface tangent
to this triangle. Any lower indierence surface cuts the triangle in a (deformed) circular
fashion.
We now construct an example of nonexistence of equilibrium for some r
1
. Choose a
Walrasian allocation x

(which is inside the hexagon) and an endowment e as in Figure 4.
At this Walrasian equilibrium, household 1 is selling good 1 and buying goods 2 and 3, and
vice versa for household 2. Corresponding to x

; there exist a vector r(E ; p

) of nonbinding
constraints and related lines r
h
l
: Note that this vector can be computed without completely
specifying the degree of convexity of u
h
: Choose r
1
< r
1
(E ; p

); so x

is not feasible for
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household 1: In Figure 4, we are now on the line r
1
1
: We are forcing household 1 to consume
more of good 1. Intuitively, if goods 1 and 2 are complement, this household may want to
consume a lot more of good 2 as well, say. This is represented by the shape of household
1's indierence ellipsoids, H
1
.
The optimal choice for household 1 is then shown at point A. We have to show that
there are r
2
and r
3
less than 1 that yield an equilibrium. Graphically, this means that the
optimal choice B for household 2 should coincide with A. Choose any r
2
2
and r
2
3
: If x

2
is
attainable for household 2, B = x

2
and trivially there will be no equilibrium. If A is not
attainable for 2, then again there is no equilibrium. If x

is not attainable for household
2, but A is, we can nd u
2
that leads to indierence ellipsoids H
2
: Again, B 6= A; and no
equilibrium obtains. Small changes in e
h
(in the ber given by p); u
h
and r
1
do not alter
the result, and in this sense the example is robust.
Hence the normalization max
l
r
l
=  cannot be substituted with r
l
= k. In a worst-case
scenario, the indierence surfaces of the two households leave only two possible equilibria
(in the allocation space): x

and e: Observe that in this situation an equilibrium is obtained
for r
1
= r
3
= 0 and any r
2
2 [0; 1]; the 3-dimensional analogue of Figure 3. This is because
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if r
3
= 0; household 2 does not care about the level of r
2
; and similarly if r
1
= 0 household
1 does not care about r
2
(r
2
is not binding). Hence for any  2 (0; 1]; an equilibrium will
be given by r
2
= ; and r
1
= r
3
= 0: These are not strongly dierent underemployment
equilibria. It follows that the example violates Assumption A7.
Finally, it is apparent that the existence problems arise because of complementarities
across goods. If we assume some sort of gross substitutability, see Assumption A8, the
competitive equilibrium is unique and Theorem 3.1.iii implies that we can move from
Walrasian equilibria to arbitrarily severe underemployment equilibria without jumps in
(the expectations about) r.
5 A Specialized Economy
In this section, we illustrate further the bearing of Theorem 3.1 by considering a special,
and specialized class of economies inA, namely: a pure exchange economy, with the number
of goods L equal to the number of households H; with the aggregate endowment of any
good h 2 L accruing entirely to the similarly (re)numbered household h 2 H = L; and
with household preferences represented by log-linear utilities.
6
That is, e
h
l
= 0 whenever
h 6= l; and for each h,
u
h
(x
h
) =
L
X
l=1
a
h
l
log x
h
l
; with a
h
2 S
L
= fa 2 R
L
++
j
L
X
l=1
a
l
= 1g:
A specialized economy, fully dened by the parameters (a
h
; e
h
) 2 S
L
 R
L
++
; h = 1   H;
satises assumptions A1 through A8.
5.1 Equilibrium in Specialized Economies
Given a price vector p 2 R
L
++
and a vector of rations r 2 [0; 1]
L
, each household h solves
max
x
h u
h
(x
h
)
s:t: p(x
h
  e
h
)  0
x
h
h
 (1  r
h
)e
h
h
:
(1)
Let r
h
= 1   a
h
h
: If r
h
> r
h
; the solution to problem (1) is the same as that obtained if
r
h
= r
h
: It simplies exposition w.l.o.g. to assume henceforth that r
h
2 [0; r
h
]; h = 1   H:
The solution to problem (1) is then given by:
x
h
h
= (1  r
h
) e
h
h
p
l
x
h
l
=
a
h
l
1 a
h
h
p
h
r
h
e
h
h
:= a
0h
l
p
h
r
h
e
h
h
:= a
0h
l
q
h
; l 6= h;
(2)
6
The representation is extended to non-positive consumptions by dening u
h
(x
h
) =  1 when x
h
`
= 0
for some `:
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thereby dening q
h
= p
h
r
h
e
h
h
:
Equality of eective demand and eective supply imposes, for each l 2 L;
1
p
l
X
h6=l
a
0h
l
q
h
= r
l
e
l
l
=
1
p
l
q
l
: (3)
Dene the matrix A
0
by a
0
ll
=  1; a
0
hl
= a
0h
l
; h 6= l; (3) then takes the simple form A
0
q = 0:
It is readily veried that the matrix A
0
has rank L   1:
7
Hence (3) implies that q is
fully determined by the primitives (a
h
; e
h
)
h=1H
; up to positive scalar multiplication.
Thus, the ratio
q
h
q
l
is a constant dened by the primitives. Similarly, the ratios
p
h
r
h
p
l
r
l
are
constants dened by the primitives.
The constraints thereby imposed on the products of relative prices and relative rations
come from the demand side; they simply reect the rst-order conditions for individual de-
mands, which happen to have clear-cut aggregate implications in the specialized economy.
The constraints place no restrictions on admissible prices, if rations are exible. If all
prices were xed, relative rations
r
h
r
l
would be uniquely dened, at under-employment equi-
libria; but the absolute level of the rations would remain free to vary, between 0 and a level
such that r
h
= r
h
for some h; this is Theorem 3.1(i). Conversely, if the rations were xed
(say via expectations, or via a supply mechanism), the relative prices would be uniquely
determined, but the overall price level would remain indeterminate (as well as inconse-
quential). Intermediate situations are also possible, with some goods unconstrained with
exible prices, some with predetermined prices and/or some with predetermined rations.
The foregoing can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1
At under-employment equilibria in the specialized economy, the products of relative prices
p
h
=p
l
and relative rations r
h
=r
l
are uniquely determined by the primitives, for every pair of
commodities h; l 2 H; the absolute levels of either prices or rations r
l
2 [0; r
l
]; l = 1;    ; L
are unrestricted; the absolute level of prices has no consequences for the allocations; the
absolute level of rations determines the extent of under-employment of resources, and there
exists a connected set of dierent equilibria containing a no-trade equilibrium
8
and an
equilibrium with at least one good unconstrained (Theorem 3.1,i-ii).
5.2 A Dynamic Interpretation
It is interesting to consider an intertemporal reinterpetation of the above-dened specialized
economy. Let there be T periods indexed t = 1;    ; T: For transparency, we restrict
attention to specialized economies with time-independent parameters and non-storable
7
See Bellman (1970), e.g..
8
Existence of the no-trade equilibrium is trivially veried in the specialised economy.
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goods. More precisely, we impose a
ht
=
1
T
a
h
; e
ht
= e
h
; h = 1;    ; H; t = 1;    ; T: For
each t = 1;    ; T; prices p
t
2 R
L
+
denote present-value prices as of period 1. For instance,
p
t
l
p
1
1
denes the rate of exchange at time 1 between one unit of good l available at time t and
one unit of good 1 available at time 1. If prices were normalized by setting p
1
1
= 1; that
rate of exchange would simply be p
t
l
: Similarly, r
t
l
2 [0; 1] denes the ration for good l at
time t; r
t
= (   ; r
t
l
;   ) 2 
l
[0; 1] denes the vector of rations at t, and r = (   ; r
t
;   )
denes the intertemporal vector of rations.
Let p = (   ; p
t
;   ) > 0 be given. We know from Theorem 3.1(i) that there exist
r = (   ; r
t
;   ) and x
h
= (   ; x
ht
;   ); h = 1   H; dening an under unemployment
equilibrium. For each h; x
h
solves the problem
max
x
ht
1
T
P
T
t=1
P
L
l=1
a
h
l
log x
ht
l
s:t:
P
T
t=1
p
t
(x
ht
  e
h
)  0
x
ht
h
 (1  r
t
h
)e
h
h
; t = 1;    ; T:
(4)
Market clearing requires
H
X
h=1
x
ht
l
= e
l
l
; l = 1;    ; L; t = 1;    ; T: (5)
Without loss of generality, we may restrict attention to solutions verifying
x
ht
h
= (1  r
t
h
)e
h
h
: (6)
Indeed, given any solution with x
ht
h
> (1 r^
t
h
)e
h
h
; one could raise r^
t
h
to r
t
h
=
(e
h
h
 x
ht
h
)
e
h
h
verifying
(6); all constraints in problem (4) would be unaected. The solution to problem (4) is then
given by (6) and
p
t
l
x
ht
l
a
h
l
1  a
h
h
1
T
T
X
=1
p

h
r

h
e
h
h
:= a
0h
l
q
h
; l 6= h; (7)
thereby dening
q
h
=
1
T
T
X
t=1
p
t
h
r
t
h
e
h
h
:=
1
T
T
X
t=1
q
t
h
:
Equations (6) and (7) imply
p
t
l
x
ht
l
= p

l
x
h
l
; for t;  = 1;    ; T; and for h; l = 1;    ; H; h 6= l: (8)
In turn, (5) and (8) imply
p
t
h
r
t
h
= p

h
r

h
; for h = 1;    ; H; and for t;  = 1;    ; T: (9)
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Thus the nominal incomes, and market expenditures (good-by-good), of each agent are
constant across dates in present value terms.
As such, these conditions place no restriction on the evolution over time (the dynamics)
of either prices or rations { only on their products. There results, however, an intriguing
ination-unemployment trade-o. For two consecutive periods, t and t+ 1, we have
p
t+1
l
p
t
l
=
r
t
l
r
t+1
l
: (10)
That is, intertemporal price increases are accompanied by equiproportionate decreases in
employment of resources.
At given prices, the continuum of under-employment equilibria in theorem 3.1 takes
the form of alternative overall levels of rations r, with relative values pinned down by (10).
In order to generate specic dynamics, one needs to add specic assumptions on the
dynamics of either prices or rations. An example of such assumptions is provided by the
Walrasian price ta^tonnement (here non-ta^tonnement), whereby prices are adjusted over
time in the direction of notional (not eective) excess demands. That is, non-zero notional
excess demands exert pressure on prices.
Dene
D
l
(p
t
; 1) =
X
h6=l
x
ht
l
(p
t
; r
t
= 1; p

= p
t
for all  > t) + a
l
l
e
l
l
:
Thus, D
l
(p
t
; 1) is the notional demand for good l at t under stationary nominal price
expectations and with the assumption that agents face no supply restrictions and have
available the full purchasing power of their future endowments. Then x
ht
l
is computed as:
9
p
t
l
x
ht
l
(p
t
; :) =
1
T   t + 1
a
h
l
T
X
=t
p

h
r

h
e
h
h
= a
h
l
p
t
h
e
h
h
, for all l; h (11)
and
p
t
l
D
l
(p
t
; 1) =
X
h
a
h
l
p
t
h
e
h
h
A simple form of Walrasian price adjustment is
p
t+1
l
  p
t
l
p
t
l
=
D
l
(p
t
; 1)  e
l
l
e
l
l
; l = 1;    ; L: (12)
Over the nite horizon T the only relevant convergence concept is monotone convergence
towards p

, where p

is such that D
t
h
(p

; 1) = e
h
h
for all h; that is, p

is the Walrasian price
vector.
9
D
`
(p
t
; 1) is uniquely dened in the specialized economy. Of course, D
`
(p
t
; 1) is not observable; our
example is hypothetical.
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Proposition 5.2
In the specialized economy, process (12) converges monotonically towards Walrasian prices
p

:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5.2 establishes that Walrasian non - ta^tonnement tends to a Walrasian price,
even if it may not reach p

over the nite horizon T . At period T; the economy looks like
our static equilibrium, with appropriately adjusted endowments. Hence the convergence
result suggests that underemployment equilibria at (almost) Walrasian prices are not just a
nongeneric curiosity. Because of the structure of the model, no demand rationing is needed
along the adjustment path. With relative prices fully determined, so are relative rations.
Using (9) and (12), the associated dynamics for rations are given by:
r
t+1
l
  r
t
l
r
t
l
=
e
l
l
 D
l
(p
t
; r)
D
l
(p
t
; r)
(13)
Such a formula is introduced in Citanna et al. (1997) as a direct specication of expecta-
tions dynamics, where the expectations bear on rations, and where the specication reects
a supply mechanism based on uncertainty regarding market ability to absorb supplies above
a certain level, and on the assumption that unabsorbed supplies are wasted.
According to (13) and consistently with (10), excess notional supply at t triggers more
optimistic expectations about rations at t + 1. One explanation is that excess notional
supply at t leads sellers to expect lower prices, hence higher demand at t + 1. This is
precisely the direction suggested by Walrasian price adjustments.
If, for some t, prices are Walrasian, rations stabilise as per (13). Their level remains ar-
bitrary (or perhaps predetermined), because the overall level of rations throughout the
process remains arbitrary (as per Theorem 3.1). More precisely (Proposition 5.1), if
(p^
t
; r^
t
)
t=1;;T
support an under-employment equilibrium, then ( p^
t
; r^
t
);  2 R
+
support
the same equilibrium; and ( p^
t
;  r^
y
);  2 R
+
;  such that r^
t
 r
t
for all t; support a
dierent ( 6= 1) equilibrium with all quantities rescaled by the factor : A specic value
 also corresponds to a specic initialization of the process.
In the temporal context, the quantities could always be rescaled unexpectedly from some
date t on, prices unchanged. But if the jump had been anticipated, it would have aected
consumption demand at dates  = 1;    ; t  1; and either prices or quantities would have
been dierent. The possibility of state-dependent adjustments in ration levels at future
dates can of course be treated formally in a model of time and uncertainty (on an event
tree).
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6 Appendix: Proofs
A rst step in the proof is to show that the production possibility correspondences and budget correspon-
dences are continuous.
We compactify the consumption sets and the production possibility sets using the number b as dened
in Subsection 3.2, so
b
X
h
= fx
h
2 X
h
j kx
h
k
1
 bg and
b
Y
f
= fy
f
2 Y
f
j ky
f
k
1
 bg: It follows
from a standard argument that there is no loss of generality in using the compactied consumption and
production sets when studying the existence of underemployment equilibria. The feasible production plans,
supply, budget, and demand correspondences derived from
b
X
h
and
b
Y
h
are denoted by bs
f
; b
f
; b
h
; and
b

h
;
respectively. Let us dene the set P of prices, expected opportunities, and wealths by
P = f(p; z
h
; w
h
) 2 IR
L
+
 IR
L
II
+
 IR j p  e
h
 w
h
; and p
I
> 0 or p
II
 z
h
< 0g:
Lemma A.1
Let the economy E satisfy A1-A5. Then the production possibility correspondence bs
f
: IR
L
II
+
! IR
L
of
rm f is compact-valued, convex-valued and continuous, and the budget correspondence b
h
: P ! IR
L
of
household h is compact-valued, convex-valued, and continuous.
Proof
Compact-valuedness and convex-valuedness of bs
f
are trivial. First we show the upper hemi-continuity of the
production possibility correspondence. Let some y
f
2 IR
L
II
+
be given, let (y
f
n
)
n2IN
be a sequence in IR
L
II
+
converging to y
f
; and let the sequence (y
f
n
)
n2IN
be such that y
f
n
2 bs
f
(y
f
n
): Clearly, (y
f
n
)
n2IN
remains
in a compact set. Therefore, it has a converging subsequence, also denoted by (y
f
n
)
n2IN
; converging to,
say, y
f
2
b
Y
f
: It has to be shown that y
f
2 bs
f
(y
f
): Since y
f
n
 y
f
n
; it follows that y
f
 y
f
: Consequently,
y
f
2 bs
f
(y
f
) and bs
f
is upper hemi-continuous.
Next lower hemi-continuity of the production possibility correspondence is shown. Let some y
f
2 IR
L
II
+
be given, let (y
f
n
)
n2IN
be a sequence in IR
L
II
+
converging to y
f
; and let y
f
be an element of bs
f
(y
f
):
The correspondence bs
f
is lower hemi-continuous at y
f
if there is a sequence (y
f
n
)
n2IN
in IR
L
such that
y
f
n
2 bs
f
(y
f
n
) and y
f
n
! y
f
: Let the sets L and L be dened by
L = fl 2 L
II
j y
f
l
> 0g;
L = fl 2 L
II
j y
f
l
 0g:
For n 2 IN; let 
f
n
2 [0; 1] be dened by

f
n
= min
(
min
l2L
y
f
n
l
y
f
l
; 1
)
:
For n 2 IN; let y
f
n
be dened by
y
f
n
= 
f
n
y
f
:
It holds that y
f
n
2
b
Y
f
since 0 2
b
Y
f
and
b
Y
f
is convex. Moreover, for l 2 L it holds that y
f
n
l
=

f
n
y
f
l

y
f
n
l
y
f
l
y
f
l
= y
f
n
l
; and for l 2 L it holds that y
f
n
l
 0  y
f
n
l
: So, y
f
n
2 bs
f
(y
f
n
): Notice that

f
n
! min

min
l2L
y
f
l
y
f
l
; 1

= 1: Therefore, it follows that y
f
n
! y
f
:
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Compact-valuedness and convex-valuedness of b
h
are trivial. Let us show upper hemi-continuity of
the budget correspondence. Let some (p; z
h
; w
h
) 2 P be given, let (p
n
; z
h
n
; w
h
n
)
n2IN
be a sequence in
P converging to (p; z
h
; w
h
); and let the sequence (x
h
n
)
n2IN
be such that x
h
n
2 b
h
(p
n
; z
h
n
; w
h
n
): Clearly,
(x
h
n
)
n2IN
remains in a compact set. Therefore, it has a converging subsequence, also denoted by (x
h
n
)
n2IN
;
converging to, say, x
h
2
b
X
h
: It has to be shown that x
h
2 b
h
(p; z
h
; w
h
): Since p
n
x
h
n
 w
h
n
it follows that
p  x
h
 w
h
: Since x
h
n
;II
  e
h;II
 z
h
n
it follows that x
h;II
  e
h;II
 z
h
: Consequently, x
h
2 b
h
(p; z
h
; w
h
)
and b
h
is upper hemi-continuous.
Finally, lower hemi-continuity of the budget correspondence is shown. Let some (p; z
h
; w
h
) 2 P
be given, let (p
n
; z
h
n
; w
h
n
)
n2IN
be a sequence in P converging to (p; z
h
; w
h
); and let x
h
be an element of
b
h
(p; z
h
; w
h
): The correspondence b
h
is lower hemi-continuous at (p; z
h
; w
h
) if there is a sequence (x
h
n
)
n2IN
in IR
L
such that x
h
n
2 b
h
(p
n
; z
h
n
; w
h
n
) and x
h
n
! x
h
: Let the sets L and L be dened by
L = fl 2 L
II


x
h
l
  e
h
l
< 0g;
L = fl 2 L
II


x
h
l
  e
h
l
 0g:
Now two cases have to be considered, p  x
h
< w
h
and p  x
h
= w
h
:
Case 1. p  x
h
< w
h
: Let bx
h
2
b
X
h
be chosen such that bx
h;I
 e
h;I
and bx
h;II
= e
h;II
: For n 2 IN; let

h
n
2 [0; 1] be dened by

h
n
= min

min
l2L
z
h
n
l
x
h
l
  e
h
l
; 1

: (14)
For n 2 IN; let x
h
n
be dened by
x
h
n
= 
h
n
x
h
+ (1  
h
n
)bx
h
:
It holds that x
h
n
2
b
X
h
by convexity of
b
X
h
: Moreover, using that p  x
h
< w
h
and p
n
 bx
h
 p
n
 e
h
 w
h
n
;
it holds for n suciently large that
p
n
 x
h
n
= 
h
n
p
n
 x
h
+ (1  
h
n
)p
n
 bx
h
 
h
n
w
h
n
+ (1  
h
n
)w
h
n
= w
h
n
:
Furthermore, for l 2 L;
x
h
n
l
  e
h
l
= 
h
n
(x
h
l
  e
h
l
) 
z
h
n
l
x
h
l
  e
h
l
(x
h
l
  e
h
l
) = z
h
n
l
;
and for l 2 L;
x
h
n
l
  e
h
l
 0  z
h
n
l
:
So, for n suciently large, x
h
n
2 b
h
(p
n
; z
h
n
; w
h
n
): Notice that

h
n
! min

min
l2L
z
h
l
x
h
l
  e
h
l
; 1

= 1;
so it follows that x
h
n
! x
h
:
Case 2. p  x
h
= w
h
: Let bx
h
2
b
X
h
be such that bx
h;I
 e
h;I
; and bx
h;II
= e
h;II
: Choose ex
h
2
b
X
h
as follows. If p
l
0
> 0 for some l
0
2 L
I
; then let ex
h
be equal to bx
h
: Otherwise, there is l
00
2 L
II
such
that p
II
l
00
 z
h;II
l
00
< 0: Then let ex
h
be such that ex
h;I
 e
h;I
; ex
h
l
00
= e
h
l
00
  " with " <  z
h
l
00
; and ex
h
l
= e
h
l
;
8l 2 L
II
n fl
00
g: It follows from A3 as well as the convexity of
b
X
h
; that indeed ex
h
can be chosen in the way
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described above. Notice that p  ex
h
< w
h
and z
h
l
00
< ex
h
l
00
  e
h
l
00
: Clearly, there exists n 2 IN such that for all
n  n; p
n
 ex
h
< w
h
n
and z
h
n
l
00
< ex
h
l
00
  e
h
l
00
: For n  n; let 
h
n
2 [0; 1] be dened as in (14). For n  n; let
x
h
n
be dened by
x
h
n
= 
h
n
(
h
n
x
h
+ (1  
h
n
)bx
h
) + (1  
h
n
)ex
h
;
where 
h
n
is given by 
h
n
= 1 if p
n
(
h
n
x
h
+(1 
h
n
)bx
h
)  w
h
n
; and 
h
n
= (w
h
n
 p
n
ex
h
)=(p
n
(
h
n
x
h
+
(1   
h
n
)bx
h
  ex
h
)); otherwise. Notice that 
h
n
2 (0; 1) in the latter case. As before, it is easy to verify
that x
h
n
2 b
h
(p
n
; z
h
n
; w
h
n
); and that 
h
n
! 1 and 
h
n
! 1: So it follows that x
h
n
! x
h
and that b
h
is
lower hemi-continuous. Q.E.D.
Lemma A.1 extends the lemma in Dreze (1975), page 304, and Theorem 2.2 in Herings (1996a), page 67. It
leads to upper hemi-continuity of demand and supply correspondences and continuity of prot functions.
Lemma A.2
Let the economy E satisfy A1-A5. Then the supply correspondence b
f
: IR
L
 IR
L
II
+
! IR
L
of rm f and
the demand correspondence
b

h
: P ! IR
L
of household h are compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper
hemi-continuous. The prot function b
f
: IR
L
 IR
L
II
+
! IR of rm f is continuous.
Proof
This follows from Lemma A.1 and an application of the maximum theorem. Q.E.D.
Some other properties of b
f
and
b

h
are readily seen. For instance the boundary behavior that z
h
l
= 0
implies x
h
l
 e
h
l
for every x
h
2
b

h
(p; z
h
; w
h
); and y
f
l
= 0 implies y
f
l
 0 for every y
f
2 b
f
(p; y
f
): Using
the denition of b
h
(p; z
h
; w
h
); p  x
h
 w
h
for every x
h
2
b

h
(p; z
h
; w
h
):
Now we construct a correspondence
b
 such that its zero points correspond to all dierent underem-
ployment equilibria. Denote the minimal market share in the market for a commodity l 2 L
II
by 
l
; so

l
= minf
h
l
; 
f
l
j h 2 H; f 2 Fg:
The m-dimensional unit cube is given by Q
m
= fq 2 IR
m
j 0  q
i
 1; i = 1; : : : ;mg: Let (
1
; 
2
) :
Q
L
II
! ZY be the function that associates to q 2 Q
L
II
the expected opportunities

 
h
l
b

l
q
l

h2H;l2L
II
;
 

f
l
b

l
q
l
!
f2F;l2L
II
;
where 
1
(q) determines the expected opportunities of the households and 
2
(q) the expected opportunities
of the rms. So, for l 2 L
II
; q
l
2 [0; 1] parametrizes the expected opportunities in the market for commodity
l; (
 
1
l
b

l
q
l
; : : : ;

F
l
b

l
q
l
): The expected opportunities range from (0; 0) if q
l
= 0; to a vector (z; y) satisfying
minf z
h
l
; y
f
l
j h 2 H; f 2 Fg = b: The parameter q
l
coincides with 
l
as dened in Subsection 3.2.
The correspondence
b
 : IR
L
+
Q
L
II
! IR
L
is dened by
b
(p; q) =
X
h2H
b

h
(p; 
h
1
(q); p  e
h
+
X
f2F

fh
b
f
(p; 
f
2
(q)))  
X
h2H
e
h
 
X
f2F
b
f
(p; 
f
2
(q)):
The restriction of
b
 to the set (IR
L
I
+
 fep
II
g)  Q
L
II
is denoted by
b

jep
II
: It holds that
b

jep
II
is a compact-
valued and convex-valued correspondence that is upper hemi-continuous everywhere, except at the point
((0; ep
II
); 0):
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The set of zero points of
b

jep
II
is denoted by
b
Z
0
= f(p; q) 2 IR
L
+
Q
L
II
j p
II
= ep
II
and 0 2
b
(p; q)g: The
correspondence
b
 :
b
Z
0
! IR
L

e
X 
e
Y  ZY is dened by relating the set
fpg 
 

Y
h2H
b

h

p; 
h
1
(q); p  e
h
+
X
f2F

fh
b
f
(p; 
f
2
(q))


Y
f2F
b
f

p; 
f
2
(q)


\A
!
 f(
1
(q); 
2
(q))g
to (p; q) 2
b
Z
0
: Then
b
 (
b
Z
0
) is the set of all dierent underemployment equilibria of E ;
b
 (
b
Z
0
) =
b
E:
To prove Theorem 3.1.i we will use a xed point theorem. In fact, Browder's xed point theorem (see
Browder (1960)), and the extension of it to correspondences as stated in Theorem A.3 (see Mas-Colell
(1974), Theorem 3, page 230) will be needed in the proof.
Theorem A.3 (Browder's xed point theorem)
Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of IR
m
and let ' : S  [0; 1] ! S be a compact-valued,
convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Then the set F
'
= f(s; ) 2 S [0; 1] j s 2 '(s; )g
contains a connected component F
c
'
such that (S  f0g) \ F
c
'
6= ; and (S  f1g) \ F
c
'
6= ;:
The m-dimensional unit simplex is denoted by S
m
= fs 2 IR
m+1
+
j
P
m+1
i=1
s
i
= 1g and, for "  0;
the subset of the cube satisfying that each of its elements has at least one component greater than or
equal to " by Q
m
(") = fq 2 Q
m
j kqk
1
 "g: Obviously, Q
m
(0) = Q
m
: Now, for "  0; an articial
correspondence
e
 : S
L
I
 Q
L
II
(") ! IR
L
is considered. To prove Theorem 3.1.i we take
e
(s; q) equal to
b
(s
1
; : : : ; s
L
I
; s
L
I
+1
ep
II
; q): The set
e
Z
 
=
e

 1
( IR
L
+
) = f(s; q) 2 S
L
I
Q
L
II
(") j
e
(s; q) \  IR
L
+
6= ;g has a
very special structure as the following result shows.
Lemma A.4
Let "  0 and p
II
2 IR
L
II
++
be given. Let
e
 : S
L
I
Q
L
II
(")! IR
L
be a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper
hemi-continuous correspondence satisfying that for every (s; q) 2 S
L
I
 Q
L
II
("); for every z 2
e
(s; q);
(s
1
; : : : ; s
L
I
; s
L
I
+1
p
II
)  z  0; and, for l 2 L
II
; q
l
= 0 implies z
l
 0: Then
e
Z
 
has a connected component
e
Z
c
 
such that for every  2 ["; 1] there is (s

; q

) 2
e
Z
c
 
with kq

k
1
= :
Proof
Since
e
 is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence,
e
(S
L
I
 Q
L
II
(")) is compact, and
therefore there exists a compact, convex set Z satisfying
e
(S
L
I
 Q
L
II
("))  Z: The compact-valued,
convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondences '
1
: Z ! S
L
I
; '
2
: Z ! S
L
II
 1
; and '
3
: S
L
I

S
L
II
 1
 ["; 1]! Z are dened by
'
1
(z) = fs 2 S
L
I
j
P
l2L
I
s
l
z
l
+ s
L
I
+1
p
II
 z
II

P
l2L
I
s
l
z
l
+ s
L
I
+1
p
II
 z
II
; 8s 2 S
L
I
g; z 2 Z;
'
2
(z) = ft 2 S
L
II
 1
j t  z
II
 t  z
II
; 8t 2 S
L
II
 1
g; z 2 Z;
'
3
(s; t; ) =
e
(s; 
t
ktk
1
); (s; t; ) 2 S
L
I
 S
L
II
 1
 ["; 1]:
It follows that the correspondence ' : Z  S
L
I
 S
L
II
 1
 ["; 1]! Z  S
L
I
 S
L
II
 1
dened by
'(z; s; t; ) = '
3
(s; t; ) '
1
(z) '
2
(z); (z; s; t; ) 2 Z  S
L
I
 S
L
II
 1
 ["; 1];
is a compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous correspondence, and the set Z  S
L
I

S
L
II
 1
is non-empty, compact, and convex. By Theorem A.3 it follows that the set F
'
= f(z; s; t; ) 2
ZS
L
I
S
L
II
 1
 ["; 1] j (z; s; t) 2 '(z; s; t; )g contains a connected component F
c
'
such that (Z S
L
I

S
L
II
 1
 f"g) \ F
c
'
6= ; and (Z  S
L
I
 S
L
II
 1
 f1g) \ F
c
'
6= ;: The connectedness of F
c
'
therefore yields
that, for every  2 ["; 1]; (Z  S
L
I
 S
L
II
 1
 fg) \ F
c
'
6= ;: Let some (z

; s

; t

; 

) 2 F
c
'
be given. So,
(z

; s

; t

; 

) 2 '
3
(s

; t

; 

) '
1
(z

) '
2
(z

) =
e
(s

; 

t

kt

k
1
) '
1
(z

) '
2
(z

):
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Therefore, (s

1
; : : : ; s

L
I
)  z
I
+ s

L
I
+1
p
II
 z
II
 0: Using that s

2 '
1
(z

) it follows by taking s equal to the
l-th, respectively (l + 1)-th, unit vector that z
I
l
 0; 8l 2 L
I
; and p
II
 z
II
 0:
Suppose max
l2L
II
z

l
> 0: Since p
II
2 IR
L
II
++
and p
II
 z
II
 0; there exists l
0
2 L
II
with z

l
0
< 0: From
max
l2L
II
z

l
> 0; z

l
0
< 0; and t

2 '
2
(z

) it follows that t

l
0
= 0; implying that z

l
0
 0; a contradiction.
Consequently, max
l2L
II
z

l
 0:We have shown that z

2  IR
L
+
: The function g : ZS
L
I
S
L
II
 1
["; 1]!
S
L
I
Q
L
II
(") is dened by
g(z; s; t; ) = (s; 
t
ktk
1
); (z; s; t; ) 2 Z  S
L
I
 S
L
II
 1
 ["; 1];
and the set
e
Z
c
 
is dened by
e
Z
c
 
= g(F
c
'
): Clearly, for every (s; q) 2
e
Z
c
 
;
e
(s; q) \ IR
L
+
6= ;: The set
e
Z
c
 
is
connected by the connectedness of F
c
'
and the continuity of g: For every  2 ["; 1]; there exists (z

; s

; t

) 2
ZS
L
I
S
L
II
 1
such that (z

; s

; t

; ) 2 F
c
'
; so g(z

; s

; t

; ) = (s

; 
t
ktk
1
) = (s

; q

) 2
e
Z
c
 
: Obviously,
kq

k
1
= : Q.E.D.
The correspondence
e
 has a continuum of points with a non-positive vector in its image set. These points
range from a point on the boundary of Q
L
II
(") with every component less than or equal to " to a point on
the boundary of Q
L
II
(") where at least one component equals one.
We are now in a position to give a proof of Theorem 3.1.i. One of the problems we have to deal with
is the possible lack of upper hemi-continuity of
b
 at a point ((0; ep
II
); 0):
Proof of Theorem 3.1.i
For "  0; the correspondence
e

"
: S
L
I
Q
L
II
(")! IR
L
is dened by
e

"
(s; q) =
b
(s
1
; : : : ; s
L
I
; s
L
I
+1
ep
II
; q):
Let some " > 0 be given. Notice that (s
1
; : : : ; s
L
I
) > 0 or s
L
I
+1
ep
II
 0: In the latter case, q 2 Q
L
II
(")
implies s
L
I
+1
ep
II
 
2
(q) < 0: So, by Lemma A.2 it follows that
e

"
is compact-valued, convex-valued,
and upper hemi-continuous. Since
e

"
satises all conditions of Lemma A.4, the set (
e

"
)
 1
( IR
L
+
) has a
connected component
e
Z
c
 
such that for every  2 ["; 1] there is (s

; q

) 2
e
Z
c
 
with kq

k
1
= :
We show that
e
Z
c
 
= (
e

"
)
 1
(f0g): Let (s

; q

) 2
e
Z
c
 
be given. Then there is z 2
e

"
(s

; q

) \  IR
L
+
=
b
(s

1
; : : : ; s

L
I
; s

L
I
+1
ep
II
; q

) \  IR
L
+
: Let p

2 IR
L
+
; y
f
2 IR
L
II
+
; f 2 F; z
h
2  IR
L
II
+
; h 2 H; and w
h
2
[p

 e
h
;1); h 2 H; be dened by p

= (s

1
; : : : ; s

L
I
; s

L
I
+1
ep
II
); y
f
= 
f
1
(q

); z
h
= 
h
2
(q

); and w
h
=
p

 e
h
+
P
f2F

fh
b
f
(p

; y
f
): Then there is x
h
2
b

h
(p

; z
h
; w
h
); h 2 H; y
f
2 b
f
(p

; y
f
); f 2 F; such
that
P
h2H
x
h
 
P
h2H
e
h
 
P
f2F
y
f
= z: Let y
1
be dened by y
1
= y
1
+ z; and y
f
; f 2 F n f1g; by
y
f
= y
f
: It remains to be shown that y
1
2 b
f
(p

; y
f
): Since (x

; y

) 2 A; it follows by the convexity
of 
h
that x
h
2 
h
(p

; z
h
; w
h
); h 2 H: Then non-satiation with respect to group II commodities and
convexity of 
h
implies p

 x
h
= w
h
; h 2 H; and therefore p

 z = 0: So p

 y
1
= p

 y
1
: Since there is
no rationing on the demand side, it is obvious that y
1
2 bs
1
(y
f
); so it holds that y
1
2 b
f
(p

; y
f
):
For n 2 IN; take " =
1
n
and denote the resulting connected component of (
e

"
)
 1
(f0g) by
e
Z
c
 
(n): By
Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 1, page 16, the sequence f
e
Z
c
 
(n)g
n2IN
has a convergent subsequence which
we also denote by f
e
Z
c
 
(n)g
n2IN
: By Mas-Colell (1985), Theorem A.5.1.(ii), page 10, the closed limit of the
sequence f
e
Z
c
 
(n)g
n2IN
; denoted by
e
e
Z
c
 
; is connected since every
e
Z
c
 
(n) is connected. Since kqk
1

1
n
for
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every (s; q) 2
e
Z
c
 
(n); it holds that the set
e
Z
c
 
=
e
e
Z
c
 
n (S
L
I
 f0g) is connected. For every  2 (0; 1] there
is (s

; q

) 2
e
Z
c
 
with kq

k
1
= :
Let (s; q) be an element of
e
Z
c
 
: Then there exists a sequence of points f(s
n
; q
n
)g
n2IN
such that kq
n
k
1
>
0;
e

0
(s
n
; q
n
) = 0; and (s
n
; q
n
) ! (s; q): We show that s
L
I
+1
> 0: Suppose s
L
I
+1
= 0: Then
e

0
(s; q) =
b
((s
1
; : : : ; s
L
I
; 0); q); and since s
l
> 0 for some l 2 L
I
; it follows by upper hemi-continuity of
b
 that
0 2
b
((s
1
; : : : ; s
L
I
; 0); q)  ((s
1
; : : : ; s
L
I
; 0); 
1
(q); 
2
(q)): This leads to a contradiction, because the non-
satiation with respect to group II commodities implies ((s
1
; : : : ; s
L
I
; 0); 
1
(q); 
2
(q)) = ;: Consequently,
s
L
I
+1
> 0; for every (s; q) 2
e
Z
c
 
:
The function g :
e
Z
c
 
! IR
L
Q
L
II
is dened by
g(s; q) = ((
s
1
s
L
I
+1
; : : : ;
s
L
I
s
L
I
+1
; ep
II
); q); (s; q) 2
e
Z
c
 
:
If (p; q) 2 g(
e
Z
c
 
); then there exists a sequence of points f(p
n
; q
n
)g
n2IN
such that kq
n
k
1
> 0; 0 2
b
(p
n
; q
n
);
and (p
n
; q
n
)! (p; q); and the upper hemi-continuity of
b
 at such a point (p; q) implies 0 2
b
(p; q): The set
b
Z
c
0
is dened by
b
Z
c
0
= g(
e
Z
c
 
): It is immediate that
b
Z
c
0
is connected. The set
b
E
c
is dened by
b
E
c
=
b
 (
b
Z
c
0
):
We nish the proof by showing that
b
E
c
is connected.
By Lemma A.2 and the continuity of the functions 
1
and 
2
it follows that
b
 is a compact-valued,
convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Suppose
b
E
c
is not connected, then there exist
two disjoint, non-empty sets E
1
and E
2
such that E
1
and E
2
are both closed in
b
E
c
and E
1
[ E
2
=
b
E
c
:
Therefore, by the upper hemi-continuity of
b
 ; it holds that
b
 
 1
(E
1
) and
b
 
 1
(E
2
) are closed in
b
Z
c
0
: Suppose
q 2
b
 
 1
(E
1
)\
b
 
 1
(E
2
): Let 
1
; 
2
2
b
 (q) be such that 
1
2 E
1
and 
2
2 E
2
: Then 
1
+(1 )
2
2
b
 (q);
8 2 [0; 1]; since
b
 (q) is convex, so 
2
is an element of the connected component in
b
E
c
containing 
1
; a
contradiction to the construction of the sets E
1
and E
2
: Consequently,
b
 
 1
(E
1
)\
b
 
 1
(E
2
) = ;: Moreover,
b
 
 1
(E
1
) [
b
 
 1
(E
2
) =
b
Z
c
0
; while both
b
 
 1
(E
1
) and
b
 
 1
(E
2
) are closed in
b
Z
c
0
: So
b
Z
c
0
is not connected, a
contradiction. This concludes the proof that
b
E
c
is connected. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.ii, Case L
I
= 0
By Theorem 3.1.i,
b
E has a component
b
E
c
which includes an underemployment equilibrium with max
l2L
II

l
=
 for all  2 (0; 1]: If there are two dierent underemployment equilibria in
b
E
c
; then there is a continuum
of dierent underemployment equilibria in
b
E
c
by the connectedness of
b
E
c
:
Suppose there are not two dierent underemployment equilibria in
b
E
c
: Then, for every  2 (0; 1]
there is an underemployment equilibrium in
b
E
c
with max
l2L
II

l
=  and allocation (x(); y()); where
x() = x(1); x
h
()   e
h
 
h
1
(q()); h 2 H; and y
f
()  
f
2
(q()); f 2 F; with kq()k
1
= : Now, for
every  2 (0; 1]; x
h
(1)   e
h
 
h
1
(q()); implying that x
h
(1)  e
h
; h 2 H: Moreover, for every  2 (0; 1];
P
h2H
x
h
(1) =
P
h2H
e
h
+
P
f2F
y
f
() 
P
h2H
e
h
+
P
f2F

f
2
(q()); implying that x
h
(1) = e
h
; h 2 H;
and
P
f2F
y
f
() = 0; 8 2 (0; 1]:
Suppose there is f
0
2 F such that y
f
0
(1) 6= 0: By choosing y
f
= 0; f 2 F n ff
0
g; it follows that
y
f
0
(1) +
P
f2Fnff
0
g
y
f
= y
f
0
(1) 2 Y; and by choosing y
f
0
= 0 it follows that
P
f2Fnff
0
g
y
f
(1) + y
f
0
=
 y
f
0
(1) 2 Y: So, 0 6= y
f
0
(1) 2 Y \  Y  f0g; a contradiction. Consequently, y
f
(1) = 0; f 2 F:
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Let l
0
2 L be such that there is no rationing in the market for commodity l
0
at the underemployment
equilibrium (ep
II
; x(1); y(1); z(1); y(1)): There is h 2 H such that e
h
=2 
h
(ep
II
; 0
 l
0
; ep
II
 e
h
) or there is f 2 F
such that 0 =2 
f
(ep
II
; 0
 l
0
): In the latter case there is y
f
2 s
f
(0
 l
0
) such that p  y
f
> 0: The convex
combination y
f
+ (1  )y
f
(1) = y
f
belongs to s
f
(y
f
(1)) for  suciently small since y
f
l
0
(1)  b; while
ep
II
y
f
> 0; a contradiction to ep
II
y
f
(1) = ep
II
0 = 0: In the former case there is x
h
2 
h
(ep
II
; 0
 l
0
; ep
II
e
h
)
such that x
h

h
e
h
: Since z
h
l
0
(1)   b   e
h
l
0
it follows that 
h
(ep
II
; 0
 l
0
; ep
II
 e
h
)  
h
(ep
II
; z
h
(1); ep
II
 e
h
) =

h
(ep
II
; z
h
(1); ep
II
 e
h
+
P
f2F

fh
ep
II
 y
f
(1)): This leads to a contradiction with x
h
(1) = e
h
: Consequently,
the hypothesis that there are not two dierent underemployment equilibria in
b
E
c
is false, and there is a
continuum of dierent underemployment equilibria in
b
E
c
:
The existence of a continuum of strongly dierent underemployment equilibria in
b
E
c
follows immedi-
ately if there is h 2 H such that e
h
=2 
h
(ep
II
; 0
 l
0
; ep
II
 e
h
) since 
h
(ep
II
; 0
 l
0
; ep
II
 e
h
)  
h
(ep
II
; z
h
(1); ep
II

e
h
+
P
f2F

fh
ep
II
 y
f
(1)); so e
h
=2 
h
(ep
II
; z
h
(1); ep
II
 e
h
+
P
f2F

fh
ep
II
 y
f
(1)) and e
h

h
x
h
(1): If such
a household h does not exist, then by assumption there is f 2 F such that 0 =2 
f
(ep
II
; 0
 l
0
): It follows
that 0 =2 
f
(ep
II
; y
f
(1)); and 
f
(ep
II
; y
f
(1)) > 0: Let h 2 H be such that 
fh
> 0: Then there is an open
neighborhood O of e
h
such that ep
II
x
h
< ep
II
 e
h
+
P
f2F

fh

f
(ep
II
; y
f
(1)); 8x
h
2 O; and by non-satiation
with respect to group II commodities at the initial endowment there is x
h
2 O \
b
X
h
such that e
h
< x
h
and e
h

h
x
h
: Clearly, x
h
2 
h
(ep
II
; z
h
(1); ep
II
 e
h
+
P
f2F

fh

f
(ep
II
; y
f
(1))); so x
h
(1)  e
h
; and it follows
that there is a continuum of strongly dierent underemployment equilibria. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.ii, Case L
I
 1
Let some l
0
2 L
II
be given. For e 2 IR
HL
++
; E
l
0
(e) = ((X
h
l
0
;
h
l
0
; (e
h
l
)
l2L
I
[fl
0
g
)
h2H
; (Y
f
l
0
; (
fh
)
h2H
)
f2F
) is
the projection of E on the coordinates corresponding to the commodities in L
I
[ fl
0
g; xing the other
coordinates at the values of the initial endowments or at zero. So X
h
l
0
= IR
L
I
+1
+
; 
h
l
0
is dened by x
h

h
l
0
bx
h
for x
h
; bx
h
2 X
h
l
0
if x
h

h
l
0
b
bx
h
with x
h
= x
h
l
; l 2 L
I
[ fl
0
g;
b
bx
h
l
= bx
h
l
; l 2 L
I
[ fl
0
g; and x
h
l
= e
h
l
and
b
bx
h
l
= e
h
l
otherwise, and Y
f
l
0
= f(y
f
1
; : : : ; y
f
L
I
; y
f
l
0
) 2 IR
L
I
+1
j (y
f
1
; : : : ; y
f
L
I
; 0; y
f
l
0
; 0) 2 Y
f
g: For all h 2 H;
x the initial endowments of commodities l 2 L
II
n fl
0
g and denote this H(L
II
  1)-dimensional vector
by e( l
0
): Similarly, the initial endowments corresponding to the commodities in L
I
[ fl
0
g are denoted
by the H(L
I
+ 1)-dimensional vector e(l
0
): It can be shown as in Laroque (1978), Proposition 3.1, page
1131, and Appendix, Proposition A4, page 1152, that there is a full measure subset 
(e( l
0
)) of IR
H(L
I
+1)
++
such that, for every e(l
0
) 2 
(e( l
0
)); for every competitive equilibrium of the economy E
l
0
(e(l
0
); e( l
0
));
there is trade in the market for every commodity l 2 L
I
[ fl
0
g: It follows by a standard argument that


l
0
; the set of initial endowments e 2 IR
HL
++
for which in every competitive equilibrium of the resulting
economy E
l
0
(e) there is non-zero trade in the market for every commodity in L
I
[ fl
0
g; is open. Moreover,
[
e( l
0
)2IR
H(L
II
 1)
f(e(l
0
); e( l
0
)) j e(l
0
) 2 
(e( l
0
))g  

l
0
: Therefore, 

l
0
is an open set of full measure,
and 
 = \
l
0
2L
II


l
0
is an open set of full measure.
Let e 2 
 be given and let
b
E
c
be a connected component of the set of underemployment equilibria
of E = ((X
h
;
h
; e
h
)
h2H
; (Y
f
; (
fh
)
h2H
)
f2F
; ep
II
; ; ) which includes an underemployment equilibrium
with max
l2L
II

l
=  for all  2 (0; 1]: By Theorem 3.1.i such a connected component exists.
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Suppose there are not two strongly dierent underemployment equilibria. For every  2 (0; 1] there
is an underemployment equilibrium in
b
E
c
with max
l2L
II

l
= ; allocation (x(); y()); where x
h
() 
h
x
h
(1); x
h;II
()   e
h;II
 
h
1
(q()); and y
f;II
()  
f
2
(q()); with kq()k
1
= : The allocation (x(0); y(0))
is dened as a limit point of the sequence (x(1=n); y(1=n))
n2IN
: It follows by market equilibrium, x
h;II
() 
e
h;II
 
h
1
(q());  2 (0; 1]; and y
f;II
()  
f
2
(q());  2 (0; 1]; that x
h;II
(0) = e
h;II
and y
f;II
(0) = 0: By
the closedness of A it follows that (x(0); y(0)) 2 A:
We show that there is h
0
2 H such that x
h
0
(1) 6= x
h
0
(0) or there is f
0
2 F such that y
f
0
(1) 6= y
f
0
(0):
Suppose, on the contrary, that x
h
(1) = x
h
(0) for all h 2 H and y
f
(1) = y
f
(0) for all f 2 F: Let l
0
2 L
II
be
such that there is no rationing in the market for commodity l
0
in some underemployment equilibrium in
b
E
c
: Then it follows that ((p
l
(1))
l2L
I
[fl
0
g
; (x
l
(1))
l2L
I
[fl
0
g
; (y
l
(1))
l2L
I
[fl
0
g
) is a competitive equilibrium for
the economy E
l
0
(e): Since e 2 
; there is non-zero trade in the market for commodity l
0
; a contradiction.
Consequently, there is h
0
2 H such that x
h
0
(1) 6= x
h
0
(0) or there is f
0
2 F such that y
f
0
(1) 6= y
f
0
(0):
Now consider the truncated economy E = ((X
h
;
h
; e
h
)
h2H
; (Y
f
; (
fh
)
h2H
)
f2F
); where X
h
= fx
h
2
X
h
j x
h;II
  e
h;II
 
h
1
(q(1))g and Y
f
= fy
f
2 Y
f
j y
f;II
 
f
2
(q(1))g: Clearly, (p(1); x(1); y(1)) is a
competitive equilibrium for E and therefore (x(1); y(1)) is a Pareto optimal allocation in E : However, for
every  2 (0; 1); (x(0) + (1   )x(1); y(0) + (1   )y(1)) is a feasible allocation (using that trivially
x
h;II
(0)   e
h;II
 
h
1
(q(1)) and y
f;II
(0)  
f
2
(q(1))) for E that satises x
h
(0) + (1   )x
h
(1) 
h
x
h
(1)
for all h 2 H: Moreover, x
h
0
(0) + (1   )x
h
0
(1) 
h
0
x
h
0
(1) or y
f
0
(0) + (1   )y
f
0
(1) in the interior of
Y
f
0
; contradicting the Pareto optimality of the allocation (x(1); y(1)) in E : Consequently, there are two
strongly dierent underemployment equilibria in
b
E
c
; and, by the connectedness of
b
E
c
; there is a continuum
of strongly dierent underemployment equilibria in
b
E
c
: Q.E.D.
We generalize the assumptions of Theorem 3.1.iii. To avoid unnecessary technicalities, we consider the case
where
b
 is a function, denoted by bz: We parametrize relevant price systems and expectations of available
opportunities by means of a vector q 2 Q
L
: The rst L
I
components of q are used to parametrize the
prices of the rst L
I
commodities, and the last L
II
components to parametrize the expected opportunities
for the group II commodities. Let p

 0 be a competitive price system for the economy E : The function
p : Q
L
! IR
L
is dened by p
l
(q) = p

l
q
l
if l 2 L
I
; and p
l
(q) = p

l
if l 2 L
II
:
The function z : Q
L
! IR
L
is dened by
z(q) = bz(p(q); q
II
); q 2 Q
L
:
Notice that p(q) depends on q
I
only. Let B
L
denote the boundary of Q
L
where all components are positive
and at least one is equal to 1, so B
L
= fq 2 Q
L
j 9l 2 L; q
l
= 1 and q  0g: We say that z satises the
boundary condition if
8q 2 B
L
; z(q) = 0 or 9l
0
2 L such that q
l
0
> min
l2L
q
l
and z
l
0
(q) < max
l2L
z
l
(q): (15)
We prove Theorem 3.1.iii with A8 replaced by the weaker A8' below
10
.
10
A8 leads to the following property: 8q 2 B
L
; if q
l
0
= 1; then z
l
0
(q)  0: Let some q 2 B
L
be given. If
z(q) = 0; then Condition (15) is satised. If z(q) 6= 0; then q is not the vector of all ones. Let l
0
2 L be
such that q
l
0
= 1: Then q
l
0
> min
l2L
q
l
; and z
l
0
(q)  0 < max
l2L
z
l
(q):
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A8'. For at least one Walrasian equilibrium (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

) of E the function z satises Condition (15).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.iii
Let some " > 0 be given. First we show the existence of a connected set Z
c
 
such that for every  2 ["; 1]
there is q 2 Z
c
 
inducing an underemployment equilibrium with
P
l2L
q
l
= L:
We extend z to a subset of the set R = fr 2 IR
L
j " 
P
l2L
r
l
 Lg: Let  : R ! Q
L
be
the projection function that projects r on the set fq 2 Q
L
j
P
l2L
q
l
=
P
l2L
r
l
g by minimizing the
Euclidean distance to this set. Let the continuous, compact-valued correspondence ' : R ! Q
L
be
dened by '(r) = fq 2 Q
L
j
P
l2L
q
l
=
P
l2L
r
l
g and the continuous function g : R  Q
L
! IR by
g(r; q) =  
P
l2L
(r
l
  q
l
)
2
: Then the correspondence that assigns to r 2 R the set of points q 2 '(r)
maximizing g(r; q) on '(r) is an upper hemi-continuous, compact-valued correspondence by the maximum
theorem. Since '(r) is convex for every r 2 R it follows that there is a unique maximizer. It is clear
that the correspondence coincides with ; so  is a continuous function. Using the rst-order conditions it
follows that if (r) = q; then either
P
l2L
r
l
= L and (r) = 1 or
P
l2L
r
l
< L and there is  2 IR; 
l
 0;
l 2 L; 
l
 0; l 2 L; such that, for every l 2 L; q
l
= r
l
  + 
l
  
l
; 
l
q
l
= 0 and 
l
(q
l
  1) = 0:
The set  is dened by  = f 2 IR
L
j
P
l2L

l
= 0 and 
l
  1; 8l 2 Lg: Then  + 1 2 R for
every  2  and  2 ["; 1]; with 1 the vector of all ones. The continuous function '
1
:   ["; 1] ! IR
L
is dened by '
1
(; ) = z(( + 1)): Since '
1
is a continuous function, the set '
1
( ["; 1]) is compact,
and therefore there exists a compact, convex set Z satisfying '
1
(  ["; 1])  Z: The compact-valued,
convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence '
2
: Z !  is dened by
'
2
(z) =
n
 2  j
X
l2L

l
z
l

X
l2L

l
z
l
; 8 2 
o
; z 2 Z:
It follows that the correspondence ' : Z  ["; 1]! Z  dened by
'(z; ; ) = '
1
(; ) '
2
(z); (z; ; ) 2 Z  ["; 1];
is a compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous correspondence, and the set Z is non-
empty, compact, and convex. By Theorem A.3 it follows that the set F
'
= f(z; ; ) 2 Z["; 1] j (z; ) 2
'(z; ; )g contains a connected component F
c
'
such that (Zf"g)\F
c
'
6= ; and (Zf1g)\F
c
'
6= ;:
The connectedness of F
c
'
therefore yields that, for every  2 ["; 1]; (Z    fg) \ F
c
'
6= ;: Let some
(z

; 

; 

) 2 F
c
'
be given. So, (z

; 

; 

) 2 '
1
(

; 

)  '
2
(z

): Let us dene q

= (

+ 

1) and
p

= p(q

):
Suppose max
l2L
z

l
> 0: There is l
1
2 L such that z

l
1
= max
l2L
z

l
and p

l
1
> 0: Otherwise, 

2 '
2
(z

)
implies 

l
=  1 for all l 2 L with p

l
> 0; and hence q

l
 q

l
1
= 0 where p

l
1
= 0; so
P
l2L
q

l
= 0; a
contradiction. Then, since p

 z

 0; there is l
2
2 L such that z

l
2
< 0 and p

l
2
> 0: This implies 

l
2
=  1:
It follows that q

 0; since q

l
= 0 for some l 2 L implies that q

l
2
= 0; so l
2
2 L
II
; and z

l
2
 0; which gives
a contradiction. Without loss of generality we can assume that 

l
1
> 0: Using that 

l
1
> 0; 

l
2
=  1 and
q

 0; it follows from the rst-order conditions for the projection that q

l
1
= 1: Moreover, for every l
0
2 L;
if z

l
0
< max
l2L
z

l
; then 

l
0
=  1; so q

l
0
= min
l2L
q

l
: This contradicts A8', unless q

= 1: Consequently,
q

= 1 or max
l2L
z

l
 0:
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Since p

is Walrasian it holds that z(1) = 0: The function g : Z  ["; 1]! Q
L
is dened by
g(z; ; ) =  + 1; (z; ; ) 2 Z  ["; 1];
and the set Z
c
 
is dened by Z
c
 
= g(F
c
'
): We have shown that for every q 2 Z
c
 
; z(q) 2  IR
L
+
: As in the
proof of Theorem 3.1.i it follows that z(q) = 0: The set Z
c
 
is connected by the connectedness of F
c
'
and
the continuity of g: For every  2 ["; 1]; there exists (z

; 

; ) 2 F
c
'
; so g(z

; 

; ) = (

+1) = q

2 Z
c
 
:
Obviously,
P
l2L
q

l
= L:
For n 2 IN; take " =
1
n
and denote the resulting connected component of fq 2 Q
L
j
P
l2L
q
l
 "
and z(q) = 0g that contains 1 by Z
c
0
(n): Obviously, Z
c
0
(n
1
)  Z
c
0
(n
2
) if n
1
< n
2
: By Mas-Colell (1985),
Theorem A.5.1.(ii), page 10, the closed limit of the sequence fZ
c
0
(n)g
n2IN
; denoted by Z
c
0
; is connected.
For every  2 (0; 1] it holds that there is q

2 Z
c
0
with
P
l2L
q

l
= L; and by continuity of z at any such
point, it follows that z(q

) = 0: Moreover, since for every  2 (0; 1] there is q

2 Z
c
0
with
P
l2L
q

l
= L
it holds that for every  2 (0; 1] there is q

2 Z
c
0
with max
l2L
II
q

l
= ; and for every  2 (0; 1] there is
bq

2 Z
c
0
with min
l2L
II
bq

l
= : Let the set of underemployment equilibria
b
E
c
be dened by
b
E
c
=
b
 (f(p(q); q
II
) 2 IR
L
+
Q
L
II
j q 2 Z
c
0
n f0gg)
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1.i it follows that
b
E
c
is connected, whereas the properties given above imply
that for every  2 (0; 1] there is an underemployment equilibrium in
b
E
c
with max
l2L
II

l
=  and for every
 2 (0; 1] there is an underemployment equilibrium in
b
E
c
with min
l2L
II

l
= : The set
b
E
c
ranges from
an equilibrium with approximately no trade in group II commodities at prices p  p

to the competitive
equilibrium (p

; x

; y

; z

; y

): Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.2
To see this, set e
h
h
= 1 for all h, an innocuous quantity normalization which simplies notation. Then
p
t
D
t
= Ap
t
and p
t+1
= Ap
t
(16)
The monotonicity property is min
h
p
t+1
h
p

h
 min
h
p
t
h
p

h
, with strict inequality whenever p
t
6= p

at
P
h
p
t
h
=
P
h
p

h
:
From (16) and a
h
2 S
L
, it follows that
P
l
p
t+1
l
=
P
l
p
t
l
. Let 
t
= min
h
p
t
h
p

h
; that is, 
t
is the
maximal number  such that p
t
h
 
t
p

h
, for all h. Because p
t
and p

are positive, 
t
 0. Unless
p
t
= p

;, 
t
< 1.
We know that p

= Ap

. Hence, using (16): p
t+1
  
t
p

= A(p
t
  
t
p

); where p
t
h
  
t
p

h
 0,
P
h
p
t
h
  
t
p

h
= 1   
t
and a
h
l
> 0 for all h; l. Accordingly, unless p
t
= p

, p
t+1
h
  
t
p

h
> 0, so
that 
t+1
= min
h
p
t+1
h
p

h
> 
t
.
Therefore, the 
t
's generate an increasing sequence bounded above by 1, and serve as a Lyapunov
function, showing the result. Q.E.D.
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